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Abstract
The correct implementation of security protocols is a challenging task. Like
any software, to gain high confidence in a given implementation, ideally one re-
quires both: (i) a formal specification that has been subjected to verification; and
(ii) tool support to generate an implementation from the verified specification. The
former area has attracted considerable attention for security protocols, and signif-
icant advances have been made. In the latter area, the state of the art has not pro-
gressed beyond simple security protocols with a small number of steps. This paper
presents an improved approach to protocol implementation. Starting with a formal
protocol specification, a rigorous process with considerable tool support leads to
the deployment of implementations in a flexible middleware framework for their
execution. To illustrate the approach, the paper describes the implementation of
a deterministic, fair non-repudiation protocol. Such protocols are quite complex,
as they require both sub-protocols and trusted third party involvement in order to
guarantee fairness. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that we can extend the
approach to a wide range of less complex, deterministic security protocols.
1 Introduction
The correct implementation of security protocols is a challenging task. Like any soft-
ware, to gain high confidence in a given implementation, ideally one requires both: (i) a
formal specification that has been subjected to verification; and (ii) tool support to gen-
erate an implementation from the verified specification. The former area has attracted
considerable attention for security protocols, and significant advances have been made.
In the latter area, the state of the art has not progressed beyond simple security pro-
tocols with a small number of steps. Traditionally, therefore, protocol implementers
interpret a protocol specification provided by a protocol designer and, with little tool
support, attempt to produce an implementation that matches the designers intentions.
This process is liable to produce flawed implementations, whether due to programmer
error or misinterpretation.
This paper presents an improved approach to protocol implementation. Starting
with a formal protocol specification, a rigorous process with considerable tool support
leads to the deployment of implementations in a flexible middleware framework for
their execution. This paper illustrates our approach using a deterministic protocol for
the fair, non-repudiable exchange of a business message for appropriate receipts. An
important property of such protocols is the fairness guarantee — that well-behaved
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parties will not be disadvantaged by the behaviour of misbehaving parties. It has
been shown that the only way to deliver this guarantee deterministically is to involve
a trusted third party (TTP) guarantor of fairness and to define exception handling sub-
protocols to recover from the non-cooperation of misbehaving parties. The resulting
complexity makes fair, non-repudiation protocols difficult to implement.
The main contribution of this paper is that it presents a practical way of bridging the
gap between the formally verified specification of a security protocol and the deploy-
ment of its implementation in a middleware framework for protocol execution. The
approach we present means that protocol implementation can now be designer-driven
and, aside from initial specification, can be automated to a considerable extent. Our
approach is based on carefully factoring out those aspects of protocol implementation
that are common to all (or a large class of) protocols from the protocol-specific aspects.
Support for the former needs to be implemented once only, or may be available already
in the underlying middleware (for example, support for digital signature generation and
verification). We thus need to concentrate on protocol-specific aspects, for which we
provide support for automating the implementation of finite state machines (FSMs) that
encode protocol steps; as well as automating the generation and verification of protocol
messages. For two-party, deterministic, non-repudiation protocols, we have designed
a generic set of FSMs that can support most published protocol. We believe that this
approach can be extended to other classes of protocols.
The protocol designer is responsible for transformation of a protocol description to
our formal notation and for the derivation of a set of protocol-specific FSMs from the
specification. As shown in Section 4, there may be a set of generic FSMs that represent
a family of protocols. In this case, the designer’s task is to specialise the generic FSMs
to represent their specific instance of a protocol. Given a security protocol specification
in our notation and the set of FSMs, the remainder of the implementation process can
be automated.
The novel contributions of this paper are: (i) a new, sufficiently expressive, notation
for protocol specification; (ii) a set of generic FSMs that can be specialised to specific
instances of a family of deterministic non-repudiation protocols and can be used to
guide the derivation of FSMs for other protocols; and (iii) the automatic derivation
of protocol message content and protocol handler code from the combination of the
notation and the FSMs. Section 2 presents an example business interaction and one ap-
proach to rendering the interaction both fair and non-repudiable. Section 3 provides an
overview of our formal protocol notation. Section 4 describes the set of generic FSMs
mentioned above. Section 5 describes the automatic generation and verification of pro-
tocol messages. The Web services-based protocol execution framework is presented in
Section 6. Section 7 surveys related work. The paper concludes with a discussion of
future work in Section 8.
2 Example business interaction
This section motivates our work using a business-to-business interaction between two
parties who do not necessarily trust each other. In these circumstances, to safeguard
the interests of each party, the interaction should be made both fair and non-repudiable.
Informally, fairness is the property that well-behaved parties are not disadvantaged by
the behaviour of misbehaving parties. Non-repudiation is the property that an action or
event cannot subsequently be denied. The section presents an example of a fair, non-
repudiation protocol that delivers these guarantees using an in-line trusted third party
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(TTP) to mediate the interaction. It has been shown that a deterministic guarantee
of fairness can only be provided if such a guarantor TTP is available to protect the
interests of well-behaved parties [8, 20].
A B
1. msg
2. ack
3. valid/invalid
4. ack
(a) Business message
exchange
A DA
msg, NRO
NRS
NRR B
NRR
Validator
NRV
NRV
validation msg
msg
NRO
ack
(b) DA-based fair and non-repudiable message exchange
Figure 1: Typical business interaction
Figure 1a shows a typical business interaction in terms of a message exchange
between parties A and B. In step 1, A initiates the exchange by sending a business
message (msg) to B. In step 2, B returns an acknowledgement of receipt of msg to A.
B then subjects msg to application-specific validation and, in step 3, sends the result
of validation to A. Finally, A acknowledges B’s validation decision. Clearly, if either
A or B misbehaves, there is no guarantee that this exchange will progress beyond step
1. Figure 1b introduces a delivery agent (DA), or inline TTP, to mediate the mes-
sage exchange and guard against such misbehaviour. For the exchange to progress, the
DA ensures that four types of evidence are exchanged in addition to the business mes-
sage: (i) non-repudiation of origin (NRO) that msg originated at A; (ii) non-repudiation
of submission (NRS) to the DA of msg and its NRO; (iii) non-repudiation of receipt
(NRR) of msg by B; and (iv) non-repudiation of validation (NRV) with respect to the
outcome of B’s validation of msg. As shown, A starts an exchange by sending a mes-
sage, with proof of origin, to DA. DA exchanges msg and NRO for NRR with B (be-
fore application-level validation of msg). Then DA provides NRR to A — equivalent
to message 2 in Figure 1a. Subsequently, B provides NRV to DA. The DA, in turn,
provides NRV to A and an acknowledgment to B1.
In [25] we presented modifications to Coffey-Saidha’s fair exchange protocol [3]
for the practical achievement of the exchange shown in Figure 1b in practice. Here, we
recall the presentation of normal termination of the main protocol to illustrate some of
the complexity inherent in non-repudiation protocols that this paper addresses. Table 1
provides the notation used for basic protocol elements. To simplify the protocol de-
scription, and without loss of generality, it is assumed that the signature scheme is
recoverable. That is, if necessary, d (and any items that are concatenated to construct
d) may be recovered from sigP (d). To allow verification of rn as a protocol authen-
ticator, it is also assumed that id contains h (rn). DA associates a termination state
with each exchange. The state is SUCCEEDED if the exchange is successfully
completed and ABORTED if the exchange is cancelled. Normal execution of the
Delivery Agent exchange protocol is shown below.
1Note: the exact sequence of the message exchange is dictated by the actual protocol used and should not
be inferred from Figure 1b
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Notation Description
rn a secure pseudo-random number
h (d) a secure message digest (hash) of d
id = h(...) a unique protocol run identifier
i, j concatenation of items i and j
P → Q : m P sends m to Q
sigP (d) P’s digital signature on d
encP (d) encryption of d with P ’s public key
V AL | INV signifies msg validity or invalidity
NVAL signifies msg not validated
Table 1: Notation for protocol elements
1 A → DA : encDA (msg, rn, sigA (id, A, B, h (msg)))
2 DA → A : sigDA (id, A, B) = NRS
3 DA → B : id, A, B, h (msg)
4 B → DA : encDA (sigB (id, A, B, h (msg)))
5 DA → A : sigB (id, A, B, msg) = NRR
6 DA → B : msg, sigA (id, A, B, msg) = NRO
7 B → DA : sigB (id, V AL | INV )
8 DA → B : id, rn
9 DA → A : sigB (id, V AL | INV ) = NRV
At the end of execution of the main protocol, A has acquired the following evidence:
NRS, NRR and NRV — non-repudiation of submission, receipt and validation of
msg. In return, B has acquired: msg, NRO and rn — the business message with
non-repudiation of origin and receipt for validation of msg. DA has the complete set of
evidence, including: NRO, NRR and NRV . Fairness is guaranteed because DA con-
trols the release of the evidence to A and B. In particular, encryption at step 1 ensures
that B cannot NRO until they have providedNRR to the DA. Similarly, encryption at
step 4, ensures that A cannot obtain NRR and then request that the DA terminate the
protocol before providing msg and NRO to B. On successful completion of the main
protocol, DA sets termination state to SUCCEEDED. In exceptional circumstances
A or B may request that DA terminate the main protocol before completion. Such re-
quests typically occur because A or B is concerned about the liveness of protocol exe-
cution (whether as a result of the non-cooperation of a participant or extraneous factors
such as network delays). Given a request for termination of a protocol, it is the DA’s
responsibility to ensure that the fairness guarantee still holds through the execution of
related exception handling sub-protocols. Section 4 discusses exception handling in
more detail.
The notation used in this section is common to the security literature. However, it is
not sufficiently expressive to support automatic derivation of protocol implementations.
For example, there is typically no agreed notation for tokens such as random numbers
and protocol run identifiers. Also, there is no mechanism for annotation of protocol
specifications. Section 3 introduces our formal notation to address this problem.
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3 Formal protocol notation
This section provides an overview of our notation for security protocols. The nota-
tion allows the protocol designer to explicitly identify all the tokens that participants
should exchange during execution of a security protocol. There are four types of to-
ken: (i) primitive tokens; (ii) functions over tokens to represent signatures etc.; (iii)
complex tokens that a designer can define from a combination of primitive tokens and
functions; and (iv) annotations that explicitly indicate some action to be performed by
the recipient’s implementation at the given protocol step (see the validation annotation
below). Unlike the other tokens, annotations do not have a corresponding concrete rep-
resentation in the executing protocol. The notation also allows the designer to specify
control flow. As an example, there follows the formal notation for step 1 of the protocol
described in Section 2
1 A -> TTP : eP_TTP(ID, A, B, rn, msg, NRO_A)
where:
ID = runID(A, B, TTP, rn)
NRO_A = sS_A(ID, A, B, h(msg))
An integer value is used to identify each step of a protocol. As in the informal
description, the sender and intended recipient(s) of the protocol message are separated
by an arrow (->). All the tokens to be sent in the protocol message follow the colon that
follows the recipient(s). Tokens are separated by a comma. If annotations are present, a
second colon separates annotations from the tokens that comprise the protocol message.
The above example illustrates the use of both primitive tokens (A, TTP, msg etc.) and
functions (eP_TTP() etc.), and the definition of complex tokens (ID and NRO_A). We
now define the more significant components of the notation.
Application payload (msg): The purpose of many protocols is to exchange some
application payload that may be signed, encrypted and/or subject to application-level
validation. The primitive token: msg represents this payload (typically, some business
message).
Participants (A, B etc.): Uppercase primitive tokens such as: A, B and TTP uniquely
identify each protocol participant.
Random Number (rni): Many protocols exchange one or more secure random
numbers. These are uniquely identified by the primitive token: rni. The i distinguishes
between different random number instances. For example, two different random num-
bers in a protocol could be identified as: rn1 and rn2. rn can be used in a protocol that
exchanges only one random number.
Symmetric Key (ki): Any symmetric keys exchanged in a protocol are identified
by primitive tokens: ki, where, as with random numbers, the i is replaced by a number
to distinguish between different key instances. k may be used if only one symmetric
key is present.
Message Digest (h()): The hash function: h(t1, t2, ... tn) represents a se-
cure message digest over the concatenation of the identified tokens (see h(msg), above).
Asymmetric Encryption (eP_X()): The function: eP_X(t1, t2, ... tn) repre-
sents asymmetric, or public key, encryption of the identified tokens. X is the participant
identifier for the public key used. For example, eP_TTP(...), above, indicates encryp-
tion with TTP’s public key.
Symmetric Encryption (e_kn()): The function: e_kn(t1, t2, ... tn) repre-
sents symmetric key encryption of the identified tokens. kn identifies the symmetric
key used.
Digital Signatures (sS_X()): The function: sS_X(t1, t2, ... tn) represents a
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digital signature over the identified tokens. X is the participant identifier for the signing
key used. For example, NRO_A above is a user-defined token that represents A’s signature
over ID, A, B, and h(msg).
Protocol Run Identifiers (runID()): The function: runID(t1, t2, ... tn) is
a message digest that also specifies: (i) the token that acts as a unique protocol run
identifier and (ii) the input to generate the identifier. A unique run identifier is required
to distinguish between different protocol runs and determine which run a given message
belongs to.
Application-level Validation (a_val): The annotation: a_val identifies the step
of the protocol when the recipient(s) may perform application-level validation of the
protocol message. For example, this token would be appended to the formal specifi-
cation of step 6 of the protocol described in Section 2 to indicate the point at which B
performs application-level validation.
Validation Decision (vd_X): The primitive token: vD_X represents the decision with
respect to application-level validation as generated by participant X.
Control Flow. It is common in exception handling to evaluate some expression in
order to determine which protocol message to send. This protocol control is expressed
as follows:
IF <expr1> THEN
1 X -> Y : message1
ELSE IF <expr2> THEN
2 X -> Y : message2
ELSE
3 X -> Y : message3
If X evaluates expr1 to true, they send message1 to Y. Otherwise, if expr2 is true, X
sends message2 to Y. Otherwise, they send message3 to Y. Expressions use the logical
operators (==, !=, &&, ||, <, >). An expression may query the state of the related main
protocol. This state is represented by lastStep (the last step of the protocol executed
from the point of view of X) and status (the status of the protocol from the point of
view of X). status can have one of three values: (ABORTED, SUCCEEDED, INCOMPLETE).
4 Finite state machine representation
This section shows how a family of nine two-party, deterministic, fair non-repudiation
protocols can be represented using finite state machines (FSMs). Specific instances of
the FSMs can be automatically generated from a protocol represented in the notation
presented in Section 3. These FSMs define the progress of a protocol in terms of
protocol states and the messages that trigger transitions between states. Exchanges that
belong to the protocol family have the following characteristics:
1. They are two-party. That is, there are two parties wishing to exchange informa-
tion. Other parties may support the exchange (see (3) below).
2. They are deterministic. All protocol participants can eventually reach a known
termination state and that state is fair for all well-behaved parties.
3. They, necessarily, use a guarantor TTP in some capacity to deliver deterministic
fairness.
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4. Taken together, the exchange comprises a main protocol for normal termination
(that may or may not involve a TTP directly) and zero or more exception han-
dling sub-protocols that involve the TTP to achieve termination. Participants
use exception handling sub-protocols to request that the TTP abort or resolve an
exchange. An aborted exchange is where the TTP ensures that no party, other
than the TTP, receives any useful information about the exchange. A resolved
exchange is where the TTP ensures that all expected items (or their equivalent)
are available to well-behaved parties.
Of the eleven deterministic, TTP-based fair non-repudiation protocols that we are
aware of, nine have the above characteristics. These nine supported protocols are pre-
sented in: [3, 25, 33, 31, 32, 14, 17, 10, 29]. The other two protocols (in [30] and
[34]) include timing information and are not supported. The issue of the specification
of timing information is discussed in Section 8.
Section 4.1 describes the generic FSMs that represent the main protocol for the
family of protocols characterised above. Section 4.1 presents generic FSMs for excep-
tion handling sub-protocols.
4.1 Main protocol FSMs
There are two FSMs for the main protocol: one for the protocol initiator and the other
for protocol responders. Protocol responders include both the other party to the ex-
change and any inline or online TTP involved in the main protocol.
S0
S1
S2
Sn-1
Handle
Exception
Sn
...
begin protocol
send message 1
receive valid message
send next message(s)
exception
invoke EH sub
protocol
(invalid | unexpected)
message
(invalid | unexpected)
message
(invalid | unexpected)
message
any
message
exception
invoke EH sub
protocol
exception
invoke EH sub
protocol
receive valid message
send next message(s)
receive valid message
send next message(s)
receive valid message
send next message(s)
notify success
start
(a) Protocol initiator FSM
S1
S2
Sn-1
Handle
Exception
...
(invalid | unexpected)
message
(invalid | unexpected)
message
(invalid | unexpected)
message
Sn
receive valid message
send next message(s)
receive valid message
send next message(s)
receive valid message
send next message(s)
receive valid message
send next message(s)
notify success
exception
invoke EH sub
protocol
exception
invoke EH sub
protocol
start
(b) Protocol responder FSM
Figure 2: FSMs for main protocol
Figure 2a shows the protocol initiator’s FSM. The initiator (A) starts in state S0.
Any messages received in this state are ignored and A remains in state S0. The FSM
end states are Sn for normal termination and HandleException otherwise. From state
SO, A starts a protocol by generating the first message and sending the message to the
intended recipient. The act of sending the first message causes transition to state S1.
From state S1 the following may happen:
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Normal progress. The initiator protocol FSM proceeds as normal from state S1 to
state Sn-1. That is, A only receives valid messages. Also, in response, A sends
one or more protocol messages to effect transition to the next state. Normal
protocol termination is represented by the final transition to state Sn.
No progress. A remains in its current normal state (one of S1 to Sn-1), as long as the
message required for transition to the next normal state has not been received
and exception handling has not been triggered. As shown, receipt of an invalid
or unexpected message does not cause transition to the next state nor does it
necessarily trigger an exception.
Transition to HandleException. Transition from any of the intermediate states, S1
to Sn-1, to the HandleException state is triggered by a local exception event.
Exceptions may include timeouts waiting for a protocol message or, for example,
the receipt of a number of invalid messages or certain types of messages. In the
implementation, the middleware is configurable to generate such events during
protocol execution. Transition to HandleException results in the invocation of an
exception handling sub-protocol and is, in effect, the start state for A’s exception
handling FSM (see Section 4.1).
The responder FSM shown in Figure 2b is similar to the initiator’s FSM. However,
because the responder does not initiate the protocol there is no state S0. The responder
start state is S1 in which they wait to receive a message from the initiator. From the
responder’s viewpoint, this message starts the protocol and causes transition to state
S2. As shown, exceptions are not raised in the responder FSM until state S2 since there
can be no exceptions until the protocol has started. The remainder of the responder’s
FSM is essentially the same as the initiator’s.
4.2 Exception handling sub-protocol FSMs
There are two FSMs for exception handling sub-protocols: one for end users (A or B)
and the other for the guarantor TTP.
Handle
Exception
Waiting for
Result
request resolve
send resolve request to TTP
quitted
quit
notify failure
Aborted Resolved
receive resolve token
notify success
receive abort token
notify failure
request abort
send abort request to TTP
start
(a) End user exception handling FSM
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request
Aborted Resolved
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 Resolving
send abort token
!resolvable
resolvable
Received
Resolve
Request
abort
request
abortable
!abortable
send requestor oriented resolve token
notify success
any message
send abort token
any message
send requestor oriented resolve token
start
(b) TTP exception handling FSM
Figure 3: FSMs for exception handling sub-protocols
As shown in Figure 3a, the start state for the end user FSM is HandleException
— the exceptional termination end state of the main protocol FSMs (as described in
Section 4). From the HandleException state there are three configurable options:
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Quit. This option allows an end user simply to cease its involvement in an exchange.
In this case, they also surrender any control over how the exchange terminates
for the other end user. Quitting an exchange results in notification of its status
and local termination in that status.
Request abort. This option results in a request to abort the main protocol being sent
to the TTP and transition to state WaitingForResult.
Request resolve. This option results in a request to resolve the main protocol being
sent to the TTP and transition to state WaitingForResult.
Abort and resolve requests are, in effect, a statement of a preference for how an ex-
change should complete. Irrespective of the type of request, it is the responsibility of
the TTP to decide, dependent on the status of the main protocol, how the exchange
should terminate in order to preserve fairness for well-behaved parties. If the TTP de-
cides to abort the exchange, an abort token will be received, the failure of the exchange
notified and the end user FSM ends in state Aborted. Otherwise, the TTP provides a
resolve token, success of the exchange is notified and the end user FSM ends in state
Resolved.
Figure 4.2b shows the TTP’s exception handling sub-protocol FSM. Transition
from initial Waiting state is triggered by receipt of an abort or resolve request from an
end user. Depending on the type of request, the next state is either ReceivedAbortRe-
quest or ReceivedResolveRequest. In this state, the TTP inspects the status of the main
protocol to determine whether the exchange is abortable or resolvable and effects tran-
sition to Aborting or Resolving, respectively. From the Aborting state the TTP sends
an abort token to the end user and makes the transition to the Aborted state. From the
Resolving state the TTP sends a requester-specific resolution tokens that constitute a
successful exchange for the given end user. Sending the resolve tokens effects transi-
tion to the Resolved state. As shown, once in Aborted or Resolved state the TTP forever
responds in the same way to any subsequent requests.
5 Protocol message generation and verification
An important aspect of the automatic derivation of an implementation from the protocol
notation described in Section 3 is the run-time generation and verification of the mes-
sages that trigger the FSM transitions described in Section 4. To illustrate the process
we recall the protocol message from Section 3:
1 A -> TTP : eP_TTP(ID, A, B, rn, msg, NRO_A)
where:
ID = runID(A, B, TTP, rn)
NRO_A = sS_A(ID, A, B, h(msg))
The following descriptions of message processing are in terms of actions performed
by A and TTP. In practice, the middleware at each party performs these actions auto-
matically. It is assumed that there are routines available for generation of cryptographic
primitives such as random numbers, message digests and digital signatures, and that
each party has access to any keys they require. Given their initial knowledge and the
specification above, A takes the following steps to generate the protocol message.
1. Generate ID. As defined in Section 3, ID is a run identifier that is generated by
creating a message digest over the enclosed tokens. A, B and TTP are participant
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tokens that are in the initial knowledge of A. A can generate a secure random
number and therefore can also generate the required message digest.
2. Generate NRO_A. NRO_A is A’s digital signature over a concatenation of the
tokens: ID, A, B, h(msg). The first three are known to A, as is msg. A first
creates a message digest over msg. This digest can then be concatenated with
the participant identifiers and ID generated in step 1. The concatenation is then
signed using A’s private key.
3. Generate the protocol message. The protocol message is an encryption of the
items generated in steps 1 and 2 along with the participant identifiers, rn and
msg. All of these tokens are now known to A and they can, therefore, encrypt
them using the public key of the TTP.
The TTP undertakes the following steps to verify the message from A.
1. Decryption. First, TTP decrypts the message with the private key that corre-
sponds to the public key used by A for encryption. TTP now has the tokens: ID,
A, B, rn, msg and NRO_A.
2. Verify NRO_A. To verify NRO_A, TTP generates h(msg). They can now use this,
the other tokens extracted in step 1 and A’s public key to verify the signature over
the tokens, and therefore, NRO_A.
3. Verify ID. The TTP has all tokens used as input to the runID function and can,
therefore, generate a message digest over the known tokens to verify the integrity
of ID.
The remaining protocol messages can be generated and verified in a similar way.
6 WS-NRExchange Framework
Our previous work [4, 25] develops a flexible middleware framework for the execution
of deterministic non-repudiation protocols. The middleware introduces interceptors
that mediate the exchange of application-level messages. The interceptors act on be-
half of end users to deliver non-repudiation and fairness guarantees. In order to meet
different application requirements, a prime design constraint on the middleware is that
it is able to support the execution of any deterministic non-repudiation protocol. It
achieves this flexibility through: (i) a well-defined, generic interface for the exchange
of protocol messages between protocol participants; (ii) an extensible schema that de-
fines a protocol message header and the form of the meta-information that can appear
in the header; and (iii) a well-defined API for message processing by the middleware
that includes the registration of protocol-specific handlers for messages. The protocol-
specific handlers drive the execution of a protocol on behalf of protocol participants
and, in effect, implement the protocol. While providing a framework for protocol ex-
ecution, we did not attempt to address the problem of automated support for protocol
implementation and, in particular, derivation of protocol handler code. Our earlier work
relied on the traditional approach, where a protocol implementer interprets a protocol
specification and manually derives the protocol handler code. This section provides a
brief overview of the middleware and extends the earlier work by describing its adapt-
ability to different protocols (see Section 6.1) and the new, automatic generation of
message processing code (see 6.2)
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Figure 4: WS-NRExchange architecture
Figure 4 shows the high level architecture of WS-NRExchange for non-repudiable
Web service interactions. The WS-Security [19] standard is used to create self protect-
ing SOAP messages [9]. WS-Security describes how to apply XML technologies, such
as XML signature [7] and XML Encryption [6], to SOAP messages. XML-Signature
specifies how to attach signatures, and related information, to XML documents, or parts
of documents, and related material. XML-Encryption is the corresponding standard for
encryption. Digital Signature Service (DSS) [23] and XML Key Management Speci-
fication (XKMS) [11] are higher level services that use WS-Security. DSS specifies a
service for the verification and the application of signatures to XML; and for trusted
timestamping of signed information. XKMS is concerned with public key life-cycle
management. It specifies how to register, locate, verify and revoke the digital creden-
tials that are associated with public keys. XKMS and DSS may be offered as trusted
third party services to support secure Web service interactions, thereby reducing the
security infrastructure requirements of users. Organisations may also provide a sub-set
of the services in-house as part of their own security infrastructure. For example, an
in-house DSS service can be used to apply corporate signatures to XML messages.
Reliable messaging (RM) specifies the message content, protocols and persistence
requirements necessary for Web services to implement various forms of reliable mes-
sage delivery (see WS-Reliability [12] and WS-ReliableMessaging [2]).
6.1 Protocol message handling
This section describes the processing of an incoming protocol message to illustrate
the adaptability of the middleware to different protocols. As shown in Figure 5, there
are two phases to message processing: (i) generic message handling and (ii) protocol-
specific message handling. Both phases provide the same handler interface to receive
incoming messages for processing. Also, event listeners can be registered in each phase
to customise reaction to protocol progress.
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Figure 5: Protocol handler overview
In the generic message handling phase, an incoming message is subject to pro-
cessing that is common to all protocols. First, given access to appropriate keys, any
encrypted elements of a message that it is possible to decrypt are decrypted. Then any
signatures contained in the message are verified, along with verification of associated
timestamps and certificates. These first two steps are essentially concerned with pro-
cessing information in the message’s WS-Security header. Assuming this succeeds, the
message is validated against the NRExchange message schema. If any of the generic
message handling steps fail then normal message processing terminates. Since it could
indicate an attempt to cheat, such early termination could trigger dispute resolution.
One of the uses of event listeners is to customise the reaction to a failure to verify in-
coming messages. If generic handling completes successfully, the incoming message
is passed to a protocol-specific handler.
In the protocol-specific handling phase, the handler first determines the protocol
run that the messages relates to and accesses the message log to determine the state
of the protocol run. Since protocol messages are self-describing, the state of a proto-
col run is completely described by the set of messages that have been logged for that
run. Given the state of a protocol run, the handler can determine whether the incoming
message is in correct sequence. If the message is in correct sequence, the handler can:
(i) verify that all expected protocol-specific tokens (message digests, random numbers
etc.) are present; and (ii) verify the integrity of the tokens and, in particular, perform
any necessary comparisons with tokens from any earlier messages. Assuming the mes-
sage is valid with respect to the executing protocol, then either: (i) the protocol handler
generates and sends new protocol message(s) that are required to continue protocol
execution; or (ii) for this handler, the message represents the terminal message of the
protocol. If the message, is not valid with respect to the executing protocol, then, as
for generic handling, dispute resolution may be invoked. As shown in Figure 5, at the
appropriate point in protocol execution, it is the protocol-specific handler that invokes
application-level message validation via any registered validation listeners.
The sequence diagram in Figure 6 shows how a message that has been delivered
to a WS-NRExchange service, via its processMessage operation, passes through vari-
ous components of the middleware. Remote invocation of the processMessage opera-
tion leads, in turn, to local one-way invocation of the GenericHandler processMessage
method. The GenericHandler performs the processing described above by invocations
on MessageDecryptor, SignatureVerifier and NRExchangeSchema components. The
NRExchangeSchema can both verify a message with respect to the schema and ex-
tract information from a message based on its knowledge of the schema. As shown,
having completed message verification, the GenericHandler obtains the name of the
protocol to which the message relates. The protocol name is used to instantiate a
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Figure 6: Protocol handler sequence diagram
protocol-specific handler from a ProtocolHandlerFactory. The message is then passed
to the ProtocolHandler by one-way invocation of the ProtocolHandler processMessage
method. The ProtocolHandler is then responsible for continued protocol execution as
described above. The middleware components shown in Figure 6 access the infrastruc-
ture services shown in Figure 4 at appropriate points during message processing
6.2 Generation of message processing code
This section describes the generation of message processing code for protocol handler
implementations. Protocol handlers are implementations of the protocol-specific ver-
sions of the FSMs described in Section 4. Message generation and verification follows
the process outlined in Section 5.
As described in Section 6.1, protocol-specific message handling follows generic
message handling. The protocol-specific handler therefore operates on protocol mes-
sages with all possible encrypted elements decrypted, all signatures verified and finally
with a message that is valid with respect to the protocol schema. The only validation
that remains is to ensure that the protocol message contains all the expected tokens and
that each token is valid. Providing these final validation steps succeed, it is known that
a valid protocol message has been received. Thus the FSM implementation processes
valid incoming messages. Given a valid message and any preceding (logged) messages
in the same run, the FSM can determine the state of a protocol run and take the neces-
sary action — for example, generating and then sending the next protocol message.
Protocol messages must have a NRExchangeProtocol header. This is an extensible
container for security protocol data items that are defined in the NRExchange XML
schema. The NRExchange schema specifies that any NRExchangeProtocol header
must have protocol name, runId and messageNumber attributes. The protocol name is a
URI that serves to uniquely identify the protocol, or sub-protocol, being executed and
may also provide access to protocol documentation including schema that specialise
the NRExchange schema. The runId is a unique identifier that is normally generated
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from some base URI and a random digest (a digest of a secure pseudo-random number
and other associated input). The inputs to runId generation can be specified using a
RunIdGenerator element. The messageNumber is a positive, non-zero value that cor-
responds to the step of the protocol being executed. Depending on the protocol being
executed, and the the protocol step, the following optional items may be included in the
NRExchangeProtocol header: the purpose of the protocol message; the participants in
the protocol; the runIds of any related protocol or sub-protocol runs; random numbers;
digest values; encrypted elements and message validation information. The message
body, if present, contains the application payload.
6.2.1 SOAP protocol message generation
In order to generate a SOAP protocol message, notation for that protocol message
must be inspected. Each token is taken in turn and a transformation is applied. This
transformation takes the token notation and produces a piece of XML, this XML is
then inserted into the protocol message. Security tokens (such as keys and signatures)
are placed in the WS-Security header. Other protocol tokens (such as random numbers
and participant identifiers) are placed in the NRExchange protocol header. We present
two transformations here.
Random number
The notation for a random number (rni) is transformed into the following XML:
<nrex:RandomNumber id="rn1" >...</nrex:Randomnumber>
This element is placed in the NRExchangeProtocol header. The id refers to the to-
ken name in the protocol notation and the actual random number is set to the element’s
value.
Signature
A signature is transformed into an XML signature and is placed within the WS-Security
header.
The protocol notation: “sS_A(msg, rn1), msg, rn1, rn2” is transformed into the
SOAP protocol message shown in Figure 7. A WS-Security header has been added to
msg containing a digital signature. The signature references the body (msg) and the
NRExchangeProtocol header (where rn1 and rn2 reside). The NRExchangeProtocol
header contains other information that adds context to the protocol tokens, thus it is
required that the whole NRExchangeProtocol header is signed.In the above examples
the signed tokens are also present in the same SOAP envelope as their corresponding
signature. This is not a requirement. It is possible that the Signature element may
reference elements from other protocol messages.
6.2.2 SOAP protocol message verification
In order to verify a protocol message, the protocol notation is inspected to determine
which tokens are expected. For each token in turn, an XPath XML query is used to
extract the token from the SOAP message. XPath queries can be used to select a set of
elements, attributes and/or values from an XML document according to some criteria.
The basic notation allows the selection of elements using a directory-like structure. The
’/’ character is used to delimit each level of a document hierarchy. Further filtering can
be applied based on attribute values.
Random number
The following expression returns the value of a particular random number:
//nrex:NRExchangeProtocol/nrex:RandomNumber[@id=’rn1’]/text()
14
<soap:Envelope>
<soap:Header>
<wsse:Security>
<ds:Signature>
<ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:Reference URI="#nrex_header">
<Transforms>...</Transforms>
<DigestMethod Algorithm="..."/>
<DigestValue>...</DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#body">
<Transforms>...</Transforms>
<DigestMethod Algorithm="..."/>
<DigestValue>...</DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue>...</ds:SignatureValue>
</ds:Signature>
</wsse:Security>
<nrex:NRExchangeProtocol id="nrex_header" ... >
<nrex:RandomNumber id="rn1" ...>
...
</nrex:NRExchangeProtocol>
</soap:header>
<soap:Body id=’ body >...</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
Figure 7: Signature token transformation
Here the [@id=’rn1’] syntax ensures that the random number returned is that with
a specific id attribute value. The id attribute associates the value of the random num-
ber with a particular random number specified in the protocol specification. In this
example, the random number returned is the one associated with the token rn1.
Signature
A signature consists of one or more digests that are signed using a private key. To verify
a signature element each of the digests must be verified. On successful verification, the
signature value is obtained and verified using the signer’s public key. The signature
value is then compared to the value of the SignedInfo block. The following XPath
query returns the signature value:
//wsse:Security/ds:Signature/ds:SignatureValue/text()
The following XPath query returns the signedInfo block:
//wsse:Security/ds:Signature/ds:SignedInfo
7 Related work
There have been various publications regarding the automatic implementation of secu-
rity protocols. We are not aware of any that address this problem for non-repudiation
protocols.
Researchers at the University of Berkeley [22, 21, 27] developed a process for
automatically generating, verifying and implementing security protocols. This work
does not address non-repudiation protocols. The process begins with a specification of
what the protocol needs to achieve and the maximum cost (such as number of messages
or encryption operations) of execution. The automatic generation technique then uses
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a brute force technique to generate all possible permutations of protocols that fit within
the cost metrics allowed. Pruning techniques are then used to remove the majority of
these protocols. A smaller set of candidate protocols is then obtained. Starting with the
cheapest protocol each one is modeled and then verified. This process of verification is
automated by a tool called Athena [26]. If a suitable and correct protocol is found, the
implementation phase creates a Java implementation. Unfortunately it is unclear how
the Java implementation is produced and what it comprises of as there is no published
work on this matter. It is also commented on by the authors that they are unsure that
the process of automatically generating security protocols will scale up to protocols
requiring more than three steps. As a result it looks doubtful that the process could
be used to create a fair non-repudiation protocol with four or five steps. Furthermore,
there is no mention of support for sub-protocols — these are essential for providing
timeliness in fair non-repudiation protocols.
Several pieces of work [5, 24, 28, 18], take a formal specification of a security
protocol and then automatically generate Java code. This Java code uses the formal
specification of the protocol to automatically generate and verify protocol messages.
The protocol is then implemented by creating a stub for each participant that sends,
receives and verifies protocol messages in the right order. If the protocol completes, it
is assumed that the intentions of the protocol (authenticating both parties, for example)
have succeeded. Unfortunately, this approach is not appropriate for non-repudiation
protocols. Once the non-repudiation protocol run has completed successfully, it must
remain possible to prove what has happened to an external party. This requires a large
amount of infrastructure, such as logging and time stamping services. None of these
implementations provide such a framework. Again, neither do they support exception
handling sub-protocols.
Work by Abdullah and Menascé [1] proposes a mechanism for automating the pro-
tocol implementation part of a specific protocol production process. In this process, the
protocol designer produces an FSM and RFC (request for comments — a document that
describes the protocol). Protocol developers then read and interpret these documents
and then implement the protocol. Abdullah and Menascé automate the implementation
phase by taking the FSM and represent it in an XML document. This XML document
also contains descriptions of the protocol messages. The protocol implementation is
created by using XSLT (a mechanism for transforming an XML document into some
other document) to transform the XML FSM description into Java class files. This pro-
tocol production process does not allow for protocol verification. As a result the input
protocol could be incorrect. Furthermore, the XML language for describing the FSM
is rather complicated and thus error prone. As with the other work in this area, there is
no support for non-repudiation.
Casper [16] offers a notation for representing security protocols. This notation is
similar to that used in the literature. However, the notation requires additional informa-
tion to specify the nature of some of the tokens (for example random numbers). Also,
Casper does not describe control flow.
Louridas [15] provides guidance on good practice for the design and implementa-
tion of non-repudiation protocols. The process we present in this paper takes account of
this guidance and, in effect, extends it by providing significant tool support to actually
derive implementations.
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8 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we proposed a rigorous scheme for implementing security protocols. In
particular it was shown how a class of non-repudiation protocols, specified in our spe-
cific formal notation, could be represented using a collection of FSMs. These FSMs
are used to control the flow through a protocol run. State transitions in the protocol are
triggered by receipt of protocol messages. In turn, a transition will trigger the sending
of zero or more protocol messages. It was shown how protocol messages could be
automatically generated and verified from the formal notation. The paper concluded
by showing how non-repudiation protocols could be automatically implemented in our
WS-NRExchange protocol execution framework.
The protocol representation techniques presented in this paper do not support multi-
party security protocols; such as fair multi-party non-repudiation protocols. Many
multi-party protocols are generalisations of two-party protocols. Therefore, it should
be possible to extend the ideas in this paper to support multi-party variants. However,
research into fair multi-party non-repudiation protocols is quite recent and we have
therefore left investigation of their automated implementation for future work. Simi-
larly, there are insufficient protocols that include timing information and we have left
the derivation of common technique for handling time tokens for future work.
Work by Kleiner and Roscoe [13] takes security protocols that have been designed
for Web services and reverse engineers them to produce a formal protocol specification.
The reverse engineering process involves observing a run of the protocol and obtaining
each protocol message. These protocol messages are parsed for recognised tokens such
that a protocol specification (similar to that used in the literature) can be obtained. The
intention is to then to verify the protocol specification. Round trip verification could
be achieved using this process. Real protocol messages would be observed from a
protocol developed and run using WS-NRExchange. These protocol messages would
then be used to derive a protocol specification as described by Kleiner and Roscoe
. The resulting protocol specification could then be compared to our original protocol
specification. If they are functionally equivalent, we can further increase the confidence
in our implementation process.
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